Venezuela's Military Buildup: Legitimate Threat or Angling for a Better Deal?

Venezuela's increased military presence along its border with Guyana is alarming, but also comes amid talks over sanctions against the country.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro meets with military personnel at a naval base in Puerto Cabello. Image source

Satellite imagery shows increased Venezuelan military operations near the country’s eastern border with Guyana. Images collected by Maxar Technologies in January show a growing presence of the Anacoco Island military base on the Cuyuni River, with large sections of rainforest recently cleared, new infrastructure developed, and various military vehicles – including at least one helicopter present. The area is also home to a new airstrip, improved roads, and equipment to possibly construct a new bridge connecting it to the rest of the country. In January, Venezuela boasted about its regional military presence and ran videos on its official army social media accounts showing some of its work in the area. This buildup comes amid growing tensions between Venezuela and Guyana over Caracas’ claim to some two-thirds of the latter’s current territory.  

Tensions between Venezuela and Guyana continue to rise as Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro regularly calls for the annexation of a vast portion of Guyanese territory. However, this rhetoric and military buildup may be a bargaining tool for the heavily sanctioned regime. In this article, we look at the current dispute over the territory of Essequibo and what we might expect following a pivotal meeting set to occur this month. 

The territory claimed by Venezuela accounts for roughly two-thirds of Guyana’s current territory. Image source

Essequibo is sparsely populated and home to densely forested terrain and coastal swamps that make a conventional invasion practically impossible. Image source

Venezuela’s increasingly aggressive response to an old claim

The dispute over the Essequibo region began in 1895 when the British government claimed control over the Essequibo River basin, which the Venezuelans contested. Although an 1899 settlement awarded part of the territory to Venezuela, Caracas claimed the entire territory as its own in 1961. Upon exiting in 1966, the departing British awarded the entire territory to the newly independent Guyana. The 160,000 square-kilometer territory is rich in natural resources such as gold, diamonds, bauxite, and, most notably, oil. However, the densely forested and sparsely populated territory is home to rugged terrain, extensive coastal swamps, and a near-total lack of transport infrastructure, rendering an invasion by land or amphibious assault practically impossible. For this reason, Maduro’s only hope for annexation is to mount a protracted guerilla campaign. 

Although Venezuela remains under intense pressure from international sanctions and a struggling economy, it continues to ratchet up tensions over the disputed region. On March 21, Venezuela’s legislative body approved the creation of a new Venezuelan state in the Essequibo region, named Guayana Esequiba. In December, Venezuela held a national referendum in favor of annexation. The Maduro government claims 10 million citizens voted but has not released any official results. Although both countries agreed not to use military force regarding the contested region, the Maduro government continues to make moves that signal potential annexation. On December 5, Maduro instructed Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) – Venezuela’s national oil company – and the Corporation of Guayana (CVG) – a major state-owned mining company - to create Essequibo-oriented subsidiaries. In February, Guyana accused Venezuela of building up military assets along its eastern border, providing satellite imagery showing military movements in the area. Venezuela did not deny the allegations, claiming that Guyana granted “illegal oil concessions” in the disputed territory. 

In addition to building up its military presence along the Guyanese border, Venezuela has turned to Russia and China for military assistance, with the two countries being its top two largest arms suppliers, respectively, for the past five years. Venezuela is the largest buyer of Russian weapons in the Western Hemisphere, with purchase deals between the two countries ramping up steadily since the mid-2000s. These purchases include a vast array of weapons, such as AK-103 rifles and Igla-S surface-to-air missiles, of which the Venezuelan military reportedly possesses some 5,000 units. Additionally, Beijing sold $495 million worth of weapons to Venezuela between 2010–2020, making up 85.8 percent of all Chinese arms exports to the Americas. In March, Venezuela officially added the Chinese-developed Skyfend Hunter SHH100 anti-drone device into its arsenal – a device capable of detecting and neutralizing adversary drones and jamming commonly used drone frequencies. 

Russian and Chinese private military companies (PMCs) are also present in Venezuela. Some Russian contractors reportedly operate disguised in Venezuelan military uniforms, including along the disputed border region. Observers have also spotted Russian military aircraft in Venezuela, accompanied by Russian military personnel who provide logistical and training support to Venezuelan forces. In 2018, China’s ZTE Corporation reportedly developed a surveillance system that tracks Venezuelan citizens through a “fatherland card,” and the Chinese military operatives are reportedly stationed at the Capitan Manuel Rios military airbase in Guárico. Moreover, Venezuela uses radar technology from both Russia and China, and the Venezuelan military used Russian Orland-19 and Chinese K-8 aerial combat drones during border clashes with Colombia in 2021. 

Iran also supplies Venezuela with reconnaissance and attack drones, rockets and rocket launchers, cruise missiles, and boats. On February 25, images emerged of Iranian-made Zolfaghar boats in the Gulf of Paria, which lies between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, and west of Essequibo.

Venezuelan troops carrying various Russian weapons. Russian mercenaries have been operating in Venezuela since at least 2017. Image source

Guyana seeks international partnerships

Last December, Guyana appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled that Venezuela must abstain from “taking any action that could alter the current status quo in the contested Essequibo region.” However, the Venezuelan government does not recognize the ICJ and instead insists on dealing with the Guyanese government directly. However, Guyana has a total armed force of around 3,400 personnel, mostly police officers. Compared to Venezuela’s total force of 123,000 regulars, direct negotiations clearly favor the Venezuelans. For this reason, Guyana has turned to international partners for military assistance. 

Guyana has several security agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom that strengthen its operational and tactical capabilities. Between last February and November, the Guyanese Defense Forces (GDF) met with members of the U.S. Army 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) to discuss regional security threats and enhance mutual defense capabilities. This February, Washington pledged to help Guyana purchase a variety of new military technologies, including aircraft, helicopters, drones, and radar sensors, in direct response to Venezuela’s provocations over Essequibo. On December 29, the British warship HMS Trent arrived in Guyana, marking the beginning of joint exercises between the two countries. In response, Maduro asserted that the U.K.’s presence in the region threatened Venezuelan sovereignty. 

In February, Brazil deployed its army to reinforce its borders with Venezuela and Guyana in response to the rising tensions. However, Brazilian officials stressed the move was only to safeguard national sovereignty and that they believed the situation was solved by peaceful means when the two countries agreed to not use force last December.

Then-Guyanese Defense Chief Godfrey Bess signs an agreement with U.S. Admiral Craig S. Faller in 2021. Image source

Analyzing Maduro’s Strategy

Maduro appears intent on demonstrating the threat his regime poses to Guyana. Given the enormous sanctions that Caracas faces, this is likely either to take advantage of Washington’s current preoccupation with Europe and the Middle East or to work out a less constraining sanctions deal moving forward. On April 18, the U.S. and its E.U. partners will decide on whether to maintain the sanctions regime in its current form or make changes to it. Given that President Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ strategy failed to result in democratic reforms or a regime collapse, the upcoming discussions could result in a less stringent approach, especially amid uncertainties in the Middle Eastern energy market. 

This January, American high-risk investors met with members of Venezuela’s PDVSA to discuss investing in Venezuela’s struggling energy sector. Although it is too early to tell, these signs of possible renewed economic ties between the U.S. and Venezuela may be a sign of things to come that would ultimately make Venezuelan military action even more unlikely. 

Conclusion

Although troubling, Maduro’s recent military buildup along its shared border with Guyana may be just a bargaining tool for the troubled regime. However, this does not mean that the threat is non-existent. With a substantial military buildup and the backing of major U.S. geopolitical rivals, Venezuela can inflict significant damage on Guyana in a way that could upend regional security and provoke an international response. For this reason, the upcoming meeting to discuss sanctions against the regime will likely be pivotal in determining the extent of these tensions in the months ahead.