Top Ukrainian General Replaced - Syrskyi Named New Commander
Top Ukrainian General Replaced - Syrskyi Named New Commander
Top Ukrainian General Replaced
Iran’s Cyber Operations in Hyperdrive
Assessing Israel’s AI Targeting Capabilities
Using History to Guide Policy and the Challenges That Presents
Israel Faces a Unique Challenge in Gaza, Hard to Compare With Past Conflicts
The Naval War in Ukraine
Russia’s Military Adaptations
Top Ukrainian General Replaced
On Thursday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that he was removing General Valerii Zaluzhny from command of the military, and promoting General Oleksandr Syrsky, the head of the ground forces, to replace him.
The president’s move follows tensions between Zelensky and his hugely popular military chief after the failure of Ukraine’s much-vaunted counteroffensive, and with Ukraine facing a renewed Russian onslaught, manpower and ammunition shortages, and US aid stalled in Congress.
Zaluzhnyi – who had been appointed army chief by Zelensky in July 2021 – was offered a new position by the president, which he turned down, according to one of the sources. It remains unclear whether Zaluzhnyi has decided to remain involved with the military in some capacity.
In a follow-on address, Zelensky outlined the following proposed changes to the armed forces in the coming year:
A realistic, detailed action plan for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 must be presented. It must take into account the real situation on the battlefield now and the prospects.
Each combat brigade on the first line must receive effective Western weapons, and there must be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favor of the first line.
The logistics problems must be resolved. Avdiivka must not wait for the generals to find out which warehouses the drones are stuck in.
Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he does not serve Ukraine.
The excessive and unjustified number of personnel in the headquarters must be adjusted.
An effective rotation system must be established in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, where such a system is in place, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must.
There is an obvious need to improve the quality of training for the warriors – only trained soldiers can be on the front line.
A new type of forces is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander is to be appointed.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68244813
Iran’s Cyber Operations in Hyperdrive
The Israel-Hamas war that erupted on October 7, 2023, witnessed a surge in Iranian support to Hamas through a combination of targeted hacks and cyber-enabled influence operations. This report outlines the evolution of Iran's cyber and influence activities during the conflict, emphasizing key phases and trends.
In the initial phase, Iranian operations were reactive, leveraging pre-existing access, reusing old material, and re-purposing access for opportunistic cyber targeting. The cyberattacks, both real and fabricated, were complemented by online influence operations, primarily focused on intimidating Israelis and criticizing the Israeli government's actions. The influence operations employed networks of social media "sockpuppets," fictitious personas, to amplify messaging and polarize opinions within Israel.
As the conflict progressed, Iran shifted its attention to Israel's political allies and economic partners, aiming to undermine support for Israel's military operations. The influence operations became increasingly sophisticated, deploying more authentic and inauthentic amplification methods. Iran's cyber-enabled influence operations initially demonstrated agility, with one group, Storm-1364, launching an influence operation called "Tears of War" within days of the conflict's onset, impersonating Israeli activists to spread anti-Netanyahu messaging.
The second phase, labeled "All-hands-on-deck," saw a growing number of Iranian groups focusing on Israel, accompanied by an escalation in destructive cyberattacks, including data deletion, ransomware, and attacks on Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Coordination among Iranian groups became apparent, indicating common objectives set in Tehran. The influence operations surged in this phase, with an accelerated tempo and increased sophistication.
In the third phase, Iranian groups expanded their cyber-enabled influence beyond Israel, targeting countries perceived to support Israel. This expansion coincided with attacks on international shipping linked to the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. The report highlights cyberattacks on Albania, Bahrain, and the United States, emphasizing Iran's efforts to undermine international support for Israel.
The report identifies four broad objectives of Iran's influence operations during the conflict: destabilization, retaliation, intimidation, and undermining international support for Israel. Influence trends include impersonation of Israel activist groups, activating Israelis to unknowingly promote false narratives, and leveraging state media for amplification. The use of AI-generated images and videos is noted as a nascent trend in Iranian influence operations.
Looking ahead, the report warns of a growing threat from Iran's cyber and influence operations, especially with the potential for a widening conflict. The increased collaboration among Iranian and Iran-affiliated groups poses a complex and intertwined threat environment, requiring heightened vigilance, particularly with the approaching U.S. elections in November 2024.
Assessing Israel’s AI Targeting Capabilities
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