Myanmar’s Spring Revolution is Redefining 21st-Century Warfare

Myanmar's civil war demonstrates how insurgent groups can harness home-grown technologies to take on powerful conventional militaries. The consequences of this cannot be understated.

Kachin Independence Army fighter. Source

February 1 marked the third anniversary of the military coup that sparked widespread revolts across Myanmar. Although the country’s nascent resistance movements were initially expected to pose little threat to the Tatmadaw (military junta), which had effectively been in power since 1962, rebel forces may now be gaining the upper hand, even by the Tatmadaw’s admission. 

“…The country will be split into various parts…As now is an important time for the state, the entire people need to support Tatmadaw.”

- Myint Swe, Myanmar’s military-appointed president, November 2023

Three years on, armed rebel groups across Myanmar are now engaged in an asymmetric war that is experiencing profound success with practically no foreign backing while making extensive use of home-grown weapons. The Tatmadaw has been losing territory as a result, especially in the border regions; according to the United Nations, two-thirds of the country is now under conflict. In this way, Myanmar’s rebel groups are demonstrating how irregular warfare, and specifically drone use, can turn the tide of conflict against an experienced, large, conventional force. This demonstrates a trend in 21st-century warfare that is likely to have profound global consequences moving forward. 

Turning Point: Operation 1027

On October 27, 2023, rebel groups known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance launched an operation against the junta in northeastern Myanmar’s Shan State, which borders China. Termed Operation 1027 after the date it commenced, the series of attacks mounted were unprecedented in scope with the rebels making extensive use of attack drones adapted from civilian models. These drones helped the rebel forces to attack artillery installations and airfields, block troop movements, and target various military, police, and media targets in a blitz that severed travel and communication links between Tatmadaw forces, forcing them to retreat. 

The Three Brotherhood Alliance was formed out of the ethnic minority-based Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. These forces have also been aided by the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), an umbrella group of multiple resistance movements drawn from Myanmar’s Bamar (Burmese) ethnic majority, demonstrating the broad appeal of resisting Tatmadaw rule. Since Operation 1027, resistance forces across the country have launched similar attacks, capturing at least 45 large towns, multiple divisional headquarters, several battalions, and hundreds of military bases and outposts. Such gains by a resistance movement are unprecedented in Myanmar’s history since gaining independence from Britain in 1948. Although resistance to Tatmadaw rule has culminated in various mass protest movements such as those in 1988 and 2007, the current resistance is highlighted by its use of increasingly sophisticated weaponry and asymmetric tactics that have limited the Tatmadaw’s conventional advantage. 

ACLED data on violence in Myanmar 2023. Source

From Hunting Rifles to Shooting Down Aircraft: Resistance Fighters and their Weapons

Myanmar’s borderlands have a lengthy history of criminality, including the smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, wildlife, precious gems, and other goods. Moreover, these regions are where most of the country’s EAOs ethnic resistance movements are based. Although Chinese Type 56 and 81 assault rifles have been common among these groups, access to small arms has been generally limited across most of the country. This began to change after the 2021 coup and the recent proliferation of weapons across the country has been shared among the various groups fighting against the Tatmadaw in coordinated attacks. 

Initially armed with mostly traditional “tumi” – homemade flintlock and single-shot rifles – resistance fighters began setting up weapons factories to produce small arms and explosives. They have since been able to produce more advanced weapons such as sniper, assault, anti-material rifles, grenade launchers, field guns, rocket launchers, mortars, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The rebel groups are also reportedly producing home-grown 3D-printed guns, such as the FGC-9. 

The production process for many of these weapons has been home-grown. Metal for projectiles and shrapnel is sourced from pipes, old vehicles, farming equipment, and infrastructure. Although some of the guns initially had wooden bodies, they are now produced to be more sophisticated and deadly. These groups have also become more sophisticated in their sourcing, using lead, gunpowder, and iron pipes to produce IEDs and mines. One group has produced the SR-1 submachine gun, a locally designed weapon that uses 9x19 mm bullets (SR stands for Spring Revolution). The process of creating these production means has not been an easy one: hundreds have been injured and an unknown number killed testing out arms and explosives in these rudimentary factories. 

Weapons are also sourced from neighboring Thailand, where it has been alleged that they have been purchased from corrupt officials at military armories. Some of these weapons sourced from Thailand include the American-made AR-15, M-4, and M16 rifles as well as the Belgian FN-FAL, and German HK-33 rifles.

Raids on Tatmadaw military installations are another source of weaponry for the rebels, providing them with large caches of arms and ammunition from pistols to rocket launchers and artillery shells as well as heavy artillery such as howitzers, tanks, and rocket launchers. In one instance, the Arakan Army even captured a naval boat earlier this month and has sunk several other Tatmadaw river vessels. Since Operation 1027, rebel forces claimed to have used anti-aircraft weapons to down two Chinese-made fighter jets and one military helicopter. Reports that the rebel groups are using the Tatmadaw’s own weapons against it come amid evidence that firms in Europe and the US have been assisting the Myanmar government in manufacturing weapons. 

Weapons seized from Tatmadaw bases in recent attacks. Source

Drones: The ‘Rebel Air Force’

Drone usage by rebel groups was first seen on the battlefield in 2022. Although first limited to small-scale and uncoordinated attacks, these groups launched a total of 642 drone attacks in 2022 and this figure surged exponentially in 2023. Since Operation 1027, the use of drones in large-scale offensives and attacks has continued to proliferate, resulting in a series of battlefield successes. In late November, a drone attack on junta soldiers near a China border crossing destroyed over $14 million worth of goods in cargo trucks. That same month, the Tatmadaw claimed that resistance forces had used drones to drop over 25,000 bombs in the weeks prior. Although Tatmadaw forces have also started using commercial drones for their attacks, these have been less effective as they are not as well trained as the resistance fighters. 

“Drones are our air force”

– Commander in a drone squad of the Chin National Army resistance group, January 2024

It took some time for the rebels to develop drone technology and use it effectively. Somewhere in eastern Myanmar in December 2022, a network engineer began working on a drone to be used by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) against the Tatmadaw. He drew inspiration from the Punisher, a Ukrainian-made drone, and developed and successfully tested the Liberator-MK by July 2023. With a 3D-printed chassis coated with fiberglass and electronic components, battery, and motor smuggled from Thailand, the cost of each unit is around $5,000. A single unit can be constructed in as little as two days. 

There have been similar stories across the country. In Chin State, the Chin National Army has repurposed thousands of commercial and agricultural drones and refitted them with explosives. Last year, the group created a dedicated drone department filled with young fighters and operators who have trained extensively using YouTube tutorials. In Mandalay, a PDF drone unit was formed by two engineering students. 

Many drones have been smuggled from across Myanmar’s borders with China and Thailand. Chinese-made DJI drones may be purchased on online marketplaces and cost between $1,000 – $3,000. Artillery shells added to these drones are 3D printed or made from plastic pipes and filled with gunpowder and shrapnel. Payloads vary, with some groups claiming their drones can carry up to 6 kg of munitions. Some drones are fixed wing while others are rotary. Several groups have also managed to circumvent jammers used by the Tatmadaw to prevent drone attacks. 

Defying the Odds

Estimates of the Tatmadaw’s strength range from 150,000 to over 300,000 personnel, including police and militias whereas the rebel groups have an estimated combined fighting force of just 60,000 personnel under a much more loosely-organized structure. Moreover, although the Tatmadaw has a robust domestic defense capacity that includes dozens of factories that produce a wide variety of powerful weapons, recruitment has become an issue with nearly 20,000 defections and surrenders reported to date. This prompted the military regime to make military service mandatory for all men and women earlier this month, a move that could help to swell the ranks of the resistance: in one example, two people died in a stampede involving thousands of people applying for passports just to avoid getting conscripted.  

The Tatmadaw has robust international partnerships that help it to raise funds and procure advanced weaponry. Last September, Myanmar received delivery of two Russian Su-30 fighter jets and four more are pending. Russia has also given the junta $276 million in military supplies along with $406 million in defense supplies between 2021 and 2022. The Tatmadaw has also imported over $600 million worth of weapons and components from China, India, Singapore, and Thailand since the 2021 coup and has allegedly received support for their weapons production from Germany, Ukraine, Japan, the US, Israel, and France. The Tatmadaw also controls over 100 businesses in Myanmar’s key economic sectors and has been involved in several illicit trades, generating billions of US dollars annually. 

By contrast, the resistance is largely crowdfunded and dependent on foreign remittances and local support. Creative attempts to raise money include advertisements from video games, bonds, mining leases, and future real estate sales. However, a lack of support from foreign governments and Tatmadaw's efforts to block their flow of funds, the resistance has access to limited resources. Yet, despite incredible odds, these groups have not only proven resilient but have grown stronger over time. With the Tatmadaw now in its weakest position since the coup, the world is witnessing a success story in the realm of asymmetrical warfare unlike ever before.  

Conclusion

Although the Tatmadaw grossly miscalculated public sentiment when it took over the country in 2021, it likely could not have foreseen how powerful the resistance would become in the years since. Although the military remains entrenched and has a vast array of weaponry and assets at its disposal, the resistance has been chipping away at this strength, making significant gains as a result of its ability to innovate and adapt to the context of asymmetric warfare. With a younger, tech-savvy demographic practically eliminating the military’s monopoly on air superiority, the civil war in Myanmar will likely continue to intensify this year. That a loosely organized group of rebels without foreign support and limited access to foreign weapons to achieve the success that it has demonstrates the potential threat any number of the world’s insurgent groups can pose to their governments at any time. This will likely continue to shape 21st-century warfare as we know it.