Islamic State Attack in Oman Signals Broad Regional Threat

A recent attack by the Islamic State in Oman demonstrates the group's ability to evade some of the toughest anti-terrorism measures on earth. The region could see more of this moving forward.

The attacks were reportedly carried out by Omani brothers living and operating inside the country. Image source

In the late evening of July 15, three gunmen opened fire on worshipers at a Shia mosque in Wadi al-Kabir, on the outskirts of Oman’s capital, Muscat. The attackers sprayed bullets from a vantage point until the Royal Oman Police arrived to neutralize them. The attackers killed at least six people and injured over two dozen others. The Islamic State (IS) group claimed the attack the next day and released footage of the incident, calling it an ‘Inghimasi’ attack. Inghimasis, unlike suicide bombers, infiltrate by stealth and maximize casualties by using firearms before detonating their explosives.

This incident marks the first IS attack in Oman, which has historically been a relative oasis of stability in a troubled region and comes amid a string of attacks perpetrated by IS outside its traditional bases of operations. Despite repeated proclamations of victory over IS, the movement continues to thrive, and this latest attack could signal the group’s growing influence in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf regions.

Oman and its capital Muscat are generally known as quiet and peaceful. Image source

Decoding the Muscat attack

Oman owes much of its relative stability to its large population of Ibadi Muslims, whose removal from the Sunni-Shia divide that increasingly defines the region offers less fertile ground for extremism to take root in the country. However, Sunnis comprise an equal 45% share of the Omani population, and with IS cells increasingly targeting Shia communities throughout the region, Oman’s 5% Shia minority is now no exception. The attack also occurred close to Ashura– a Shia day of mourning – which is likely not a coincidence.

In a July 18 statement, the Royal Oman Police said the attackers were Omani nationals and brothers. The involvement of Omani nationals is almost unprecedented, given the relatively liberal ideological leanings of most Omanis. Omani nationals have been notably absent from most major global jihadist movements, with few exceptions. However, the IS has been steadily working to spread its ideological footprint in the Gulf region since around 2017, according to the group’s internal communications. In one document, the then head of IS in Yemen, Abu Usama al-Muhajir, wrote that they intended to carry out attacks on Western embassies in Oman, as well as the United Arab Emirates. The document cites information provided by an Omani IS member. However, no such attacks occurred before that of July 15.

Elsewhere in the region, the IS has been steadily ramping up activity. In 2015, the group bombed a Shia mosque in Kuwait City, killing at least 27 people. Since then, Kuwaiti security forces have foiled IS plots on several occasions, such as in 2016 and earlier this year. IS has also claimed rare attacks in Saudi Arabia, including in Riyadh and al-Dawadimiin 2016. However, the repressive tactics used by security forces in the region combined with these regimes’ carefully honed ‘soft’ de-radicalization measures make it difficult for the IS to operate there with impunity. Given Oman’s robust security capabilities, the group will likely remain limited to sporadic attacks moving forward.

The aftermath of the devastating IS bombing of the Imam Sadiq Mosque in Kuwait City that killed 27. Image source

The future of IS regional operations

As we have written in previous editions of Between the Lines, the IS is likely at its strongest since at least 2015, with formidable transnational attack capabilities across much of the world. On July 17, US Central Command warned that the IS is on pace to double its total number of attacks in Iraq and Syria this year compared to last, having already claimed 153 between January and June. Given this momentum, the group will likely attempt to make further inroads into the Gulf, mainly due to the prevalence of Western targets in these countries.

Although conducting frequent attacks in Gulf countries is an extremely difficult proposition, the IS has demonstrated creativity in adapting to challenging situations. This resilience was most recently demonstrated by the two suicide bombings that occurred in Iran this January. In this way, the group will likely continue seeking targets to make headlines while underscoring its sectarian ideological narrative. Saudi Arabia is one such place where attacks are probable in the coming months, despite the Kingdom’s stringent security protocols and extensive experience in counterterrorism.

The IS has plenty of reasons to attack Saudi Arabia, not least for its counterterrorism cooperation with the US. Recently, the IS called Saudi royals “slaves of the Crusaders and allies of the Jews” regarding the ongoing normalization of relations between the Kingdom and Israel. Aside from attacks within Saudi Arabia, the IS has tried to compromise Saudi interests elsewhere. For example, Saudi Arabia temporarily closed its embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2023 amid fears of an attack by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Indeed, elements within Saudi society have a history of support for the IS cause, with Saudi donors funding at least one of its affiliate groups despite the Kingdom’s attempts to curb private donations to jihadist groups, a lasting legacy of the Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s. Saudi authorities have already foiled IS plots in the country, including one to bomb the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In this way, it is possible that IS cells could slip through the cracks of the Kingdom’s security apparatus to conduct more brazen attacks moving forward.  

Yemen could emerge as a significant base of regional operations for the IS, and it is from here that the IS could launch future attacks, given Yemen’s proximity to other countries in the region. Although the IS has been largely unsuccessful in Yemen thus far, the country’s unstable and war-torn environment could provide fertile ground for the group’s brand of radicalism to take hold. Here, the US has conducted strikes against IS targets in recent years, and local IS affiliates continue to claim attacks.

A map of the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf states. Image source

Conclusion

As part of its push to conduct more transnational operations, the IS will likely increasingly target other countries in the Gulf in the coming months and years. These attacks could target longstanding enemies such as Saudi Arabia as well as other countries in the region, especially those with sizeable Shia populations and Western nationals present.