Houthi Collaboration with Al-Shabaab and the Specter of Iranian Influence

Evidence suggests the Yemen-based Houthis are collaborating with Somalia's al-Shabaab. Iran's regional influence could expand greatly as a result.

Houthi militants strike on an oil tanker in the Red Sea, July 15. Image Source

Recent evidence suggests increased cooperation between the Houthis and al-Shabaab that could increase the scope of the ongoing conflict in the Red Sea, something we noted in a January 29 article. Last month, US intelligence agencies announced they were investigating a possible arms transfer agreement between the two groups, citing recent discussions between them. With the possibility of Iranian involvement looming large over the region, this relationship signals Tehran's expanded threat to global security.   

Growing Unrest and the Spector of Iranian Involvement

On June 15, Houthi militants targeted two vessels on the Red Sea. That month, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels increased to levels not seen since December 2023, according to the US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center. These attacks have disrupted shipping between over 65 countries and caused at least 29 major energy and shipping firms to reroute, often around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to their journeys that have collectively cost billions of dollars. Although a US-led coalition has led strikes against the Houthis since January, these efforts have not deterred the militant group thus far.

Across the Gulf of Aden in Somalia, the al-Shabaab militant group continues to grow in strength despite decades of multinational efforts to counter its influence. Today, al-Shabaab is al-Shabaab is Al-Qaeda's largest and wealthiest affiliate group, controlling much of southern Somalia's most fertile agricultural lands in a country perpetually prone to food shortages. In a 2022 senate hearing, former United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) commander Gen. Stephen Townsend called al-Shabaab "the greatest threat to US persons and interests" in the Horn of Africa. As of last month, the group has reversed all of the gains made by the US and African Union-backed Somali National Army over the past two years in just six months. With over 12,000 fighters and as much as $150 million in annual revenue, the group will likely continue to make gains amid the ongoing withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which plans to fully exit Somalia by December 31, when a much smaller force will replace it.

Iran continues to overtly support the Houthis materially, with Tehran playing a growing role in arming the group in recent years, especially amid its ongoing attacks in the Red Sea. On July 15, newly elected Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian phoned a senior Houthi leader in Yemen and later praised the group and its ongoing assault on commercial shipping lanes in a public statement. Moreover, Tehran allegedly offers covert support to Al-Qaeda by harboring senior leaders in the country, according to a 2021 list published by the US State Department. Through Al-Qaeda, Iran also reportedly provides funding and weapons to al-Shabaab in Somalia, with Tehran reportedly paying al-Shabaab operatives to target US forces in the region in 2019 and 2020.

Iran's Quds force has previously used smuggling routes between Yemen and Somalia, exporting oil in violation of sanctions while funneling weapons to Somalia as well as other African countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, South Sudan, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic. In a January 29 article, Adam Rousselle speculated that the hijackings of five Iranian fishing vessels off the Somali coast in a relatively short period may be a covert way of smuggling Iranian weapons to al-Shabaab. Indeed, in 2016, Australian and French naval forces intercepted Iranian fishing vessels loaded with weapons likely headed for Yemen and Somalia.

Known smuggling routes and some arms seizures, 2015-2021. Image Source

Broadening cooperation and Iran's expanding regional nexus

Although the degree of Iranian involvement in facilitating relations between the Houthis and al-Shabaab is unknown, there is little doubt that Tehran views this pairing as positive for its broader regional interests. Through its proxies, Iran's influence extends across the greater Middle East, and should the Houthis and al-Shabaab continue to expand their ties, Tehran's influence could expand further south into the geostrategically important Horn of Africa. Should these ties expand, al-Shabaab's offensive capacity would expand significantly, given the Houthi's possession of advanced weaponry, such as aerial and maritime drones and short-range ballistic missiles. With an estimated 450 US soldiers still stationed in Somalia, these forces could be in much greater danger as a result.

Conversely, the Houthis also stand to benefit from weapons transfers from al-Shabaab. Last December, the United Nations lifted Somalia's weapons embargo, allowing for an influx of sophisticated Western weapons to the country. This influx, combined with the planned ATMIS withdrawal and the relative weakness of the Somali security forces, could result in al-Shabaab taking possession of vast quantities of these weapons. Because much of the Houthi arsenal comprises Western weapons, many of which were seized from Emirati forces during the Saudi-led coalition against them, these Western weapons and weapon components in Somalia could be beneficial to the Houthis moving forward. Additionally, the Houthis could benefit from al-Shabaab links to other Islamist movements in Africa, potentially broadening Iran's presence in the continent.

Known transfers of missiles and related components from Iran to the Houthis intercepted by Western forces. Image Source

A map of the threat posed by Somali pirates, who operate in conjunction with al-Shabaab militants. Image source

Conclusion

An expanded partnership between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could result in an even more significant threat to global shipping and maritime activity by expanding the current conflict in the Red Sea to much of the Indian Ocean. With Iran already exerting an outsized influence across the Middle East, this potential relationship could signal Tehran's expanding influence in the Indian Ocean and the African continent.