Protests have erupted across multiple Iranian cities, with demonstrators chanting “death to the dictator.” Such unrest is not new: major waves occurred in 2009, 2017–2018, and 2022–2023. What appears different in the current cycle is its socioeconomic base. Reporting suggests mobilization began in poorer and working-class communities that have historically provided key regime support, before extending into more familiar youth dissident ranks. This pattern points to economic stress as the primary catalyst for the current wave of unrest.
Iran’s economic deterioration has sharpened the underlying drivers of these ongoing protests. Inflation and currency depreciation have eroded purchasing power, while chronic underinvestment has compounded basic-service failures, including acute water stress. With limited fiscal room to stabilize living conditions at scale, the state has increasingly relied on coercive containment—reinforcing incentives for households and elites alike to externalize wealth.
Iran’s accelerating economic crisis is not solely the product of sanctions or mismanagement. It is increasingly driven by capital flight embedded within the same networks initially developed to foster state resilience—networks that now operate beyond effective control. Under pressure, opaque networks built for sanctions resilience and regional power projection now function as conduits for capital flight.




