Chinese Weapons Found on Both Sides of a Growing Conflict in Eastern Congo

The ongoing civil war in the DRC demonstrates China's rising military influence in Africa

A Chinese-made CH-4 drone on display at the 2021 China International Aviation Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai, Guangdong Province. Source

The series of wars that started in 1996 in what is today the eastern part of Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have killed an estimated 6 million people to date, making this the deadliest conflict zone on earth since the Second World War. With conflict in the region intensifying once again, there is increasingly sophisticated weaponry to be found on both sides of the battlefield. This coincides with a massive growth in Chinese arms sales to Africa over the past decade.

Beijing has become increasingly involved in Africa amid its need to procure vital resources for what is now the world’s largest manufacturing sector. Given its massive resource wealth, the DRC plays a central role in fulfilling this need. However, both rebel forces and those of the DRC government are making extensive use of Chinese-made weapons, resulting in enormous costs to the humanitarian situation, regional stability, and even Chinese investments in the region. With new Chinese arms deals to Africa announced regularly, this may only be the beginning of Beijing’s growing military footprint on the continent.

Chinese weapons showing up across war-torn eastern Congo

The March 23 (M23) rebel movement has made substantial gains across the eastern Congo in recent months, cutting off the North Kivu regional capital of Goma by blocking the supply roads leading to in since early February. The city’s residents are now reporting rocket strikes into their neighborhoods and clashes between M23, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and local defense forces that have formed to counter the rebels. A city of just over two million inhabitants, Goma is now struggling to obtain food and supplies and reports indicate that tens of thousands of people have been displaced over the past week.

Decades of civil war have left 5.8 million people displaced in the DRC’s eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika, according the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. With the bulk of the current fighting taking place in and around the town of Sake, an important corridor connecting Goma to other parts of the country, an estimated 135,000 displaced people are now headed toward the besieged provincial capital. Refugees are given almost no quarter in this brutal conflict with reports emerging the M23 bombed the Zaina displacement camp outside Sake on February, 12, killing three people and injuring at least eight others. Both the M23 rebels and the DRC government blame each other for civilian deaths in the conflict, including those of 20 people in Mweso, a town 80 kilometers from Goma in January.

Both sides have also been using Chinese weapons with those seized from M23 fighters by FARDC forces reportedly nearly all Chinese-made. To counter the rise of the M23, the DRC government purchased nine of Chinese-made Rainbow CH-4 drones last February to be used for a mixture of attack and reconnaissance purposes. These units are sold at an estimated price tag of between  US $1–2 million each, a fraction the cost for comparable units produced by the United States and its allies. Additionally, China has been known to accept payment for arms sales to African countries in instalments or in exchange for resources. Since receiving the units last Spring, the FARDC has conducted extensive surveillance and combat operations, killing two M23 commanders in January of this year. The use of these units combined with the covert support of other armed groups in the region – who have also been extensively accused of human rights abuses – may help the FARDC regain the advantage moving forward.

Mineral wealth at the heart of the growing conflict

M23 rebels on a truck in the streets of Goma, after they captured it in November 2012. Source

Initially defeated in 2013, the M23 was reformed in October of 2021, becoming increasingly active across the eastern DRC. Its current fighting force is unknown, but it was estimated to have between 1,200 and 6,000 fighters in the early 2010s. Experts from the United Nations (UN) as well as the governments of the United States and other western countries agree that M23 is closely linked to the Rwandan government of Paul Kagame, who denies any connection. Widely believed to be logistically supported and even reinforced by Rwandan troops, the group’s stated mission is to protect ethnic Tutsis – Paula Kagame is himself a Tutsi – against Hutu militias operating in the region. However, with a track record that also includes violence against Congolese Tutsi communities, it is more likely that M23 serves as a front for Rwandan economic interests: last year, the DRC government accused M23 and Rwanda of smuggling $1 billion worth of minerals out of the country. This puts Rwanda and M23 at odds with the interests of Kinshasa and Beijing.

The DRC is home to an abundance of natural resources including diamonds, gold, copper, and a variety of rare earth metals. Among these, the country is home to some 70 per cent of the world’s coltan—a mineral vital to the manufacturing of batteries and many electronic goods — and is the world’s largest exporter of the mineral. China is the world’s largest manufacturer of electronic goods and accounted for 33% of global output of these in 2022: as such, it is highly dependent on Congolese supplies of coltan. Moreover, the DRC is the world’s second largest exporter of refined copper – also essential for electronics manufacturing – and China imported $4.7 billion worth of Congolese copper in 2021.

Congolese forces have been deployed to protect Chinese mining and resource extraction infrastructure on several occasions. Safety has an issue of concern for Chinese investors with kidnappings a common issue and two Chinese nationals recently killed during an ambush on a gold convoy this past September. Despite these setbacks, Beijing continues to increase its presence in the DRC, recently announcing a $7 billion investment in infrastructure related to copper and cobalt extraction in the country. This investment also comes at a time of increased security cooperation: in addition to the recent drone sales, China sent a delegation to the DRC to sell fighter jets to the country last March after a FARDC jet was downed by a Rwandan MANPAD (that may have also been of Chinese origin). Beijing has also offered to provide training to FARDC forces.

Beijing has been situating itself as a weapons supplier to African countries for over a decade, capitalizing on new markets across the continent. The Atlantic Council estimates that China accounted for 22 per cent of total arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa in 2021 and Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer Norinco opened offices in Senegal in 2023. China is also a major weapons supplier to Rwanda, which is the most likely source of M23’s Chinese-made weapons and equipment. Most recently, a UN observation drone flying over rebel-controlled territory in the eastern DRC was fired upon by a Rwandan WZ551 6×6 IFV mobile surface-to-air missile system. Produced in China by Norinco and also known as the Yitan, the missile is designed to provide low-altitude protection against fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Now faced with the consequences of its arms sales to Rwanda, Beijing is apparently attempting to fight fire with fire by selling technologically superior weaponry to the DRC to protect its commercial interests there.

An image of the Yitan SHORAD firing. Source

Conclusion

China has become increasingly aggressive in co-opting and arming African regimes to further its interests on the continent. However, differing interests between the DRC and Rwanda have resulted in an escalating conflict between forces that are both heavily armed with Chinese-made weapons and equipment. By choosing to whom it sells high-tech weapons such as attack drones and fighter jets, Beijing may be able to influence the outcome of these conflicts to some degree, but the costs to the humanitarian and security situations are already substantial. Moreover, the outcome of this conflict is far from certain and it is likely that Chinese interests could be further jeopardized moving forward, given that Beijing’s clear siding with Kinshasa could provoke further M23 attacks against its investment projects and citizens working in the DRC.

Increased sanctions on Russia, traditionally a major supplier of arms to the continent, have opened a path for China to continue expanding its role as a source of modern weapons to regimes looking to add to their stocks. Although China has shown little interest in previous African conflicts, its vast commercial interests in the continent at present could result in greater levels of future involvement. Given the substantial mark it has left by arming various actors throughout Africa, these conflicts could intensify greatly moving forward, further forcing China to pick sides as it seeks to protect the substantial investments it has made to date. These will be difficult choices for Beijing, given its reliance on African resources and ongoing challenges at home.