Breakdown of Colombia-FARC Ceasefire Deal Could be Bad News for Hezbollah

Colombia's latest announcement that it will begin military operations against FARC-EMC could signal a broadening regional consensus on Hezbollah, which is heavily involved in arms and drug trafficking

On July 16, the Colombian government announced it will commence military operations against a splinter of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) after ending a ceasefire with the group last week. This offensive comes amid FARC’s rapid expansion of operations across the country, which include drug trafficking, kidnappings, and other illicit activities. Moreover, FARC maintains longstanding ties with Hezbollah, which is currently engaged in an escalating conflict with Israel from its base in southern Lebanon. As Colombia and other countries move to target Hezbollah-aligned interests, the group’s extensive operations in Latin America may face more significant pressure than ever before.

Police officers at a police station destroyed in a bomb and gunfight by FARC-EMC fighters in May in Cauca. Image Source

FARC’s Resurgence Amid Rising Insecurity and Drug Production

The 2016 landmark peace deal between FARC and the Colombian government ended a decades-long conflict in the country that had claimed the lives of over 450,000 people. Although most FARC militants demobilized, some dissenting leaders and members refused to accept the deal, instead organizing under the banner of Estado Mayor Central (EMC), also known as FARC-EMC. Violence between armed groups increased in the following years, as did FARC’s claims that the government was not honoring the terms of the accord. When former rebel Gustavo Petro became President of Colombia in 2022, he introduced a plan for “Total Peace” to end the violence, and his administration entered into formal peace talks with FARC-EMC last year, with all parties agreeing to a ceasefire at the time.

FARC-EMC comprises multiple factions led by different leaders. Reports indicate that between two and six of these factions continue violently opposing the government. The recently lifted ceasefire applies explicitly to the Iván Mordisco-led FARC-EMC front, which experts believe is stronger than the other EMC factions as it maintains a fighting force of around 4,500 individuals who comprise over 60% of currently active FARC-EMC fighters. Iván Mordisco began consolidating rebel fighters under his banner during the COVID-19 pandemic as part of efforts to take over and secure smuggling routes in the country. Illicit smuggling is a vital source of income for all of FARC’s constituent factions, which together control roughly half of Colombia’s coca crop, the crucial base ingredient for cocaine production.

Over the past year, FARC-EMC factions have expanded their presence from 157 to 209 of the country’s 1,100 municipalities. Last year, kidnappings by the group increased by 50% while gunfights and the creation of illegal roadblocks rose as well. The UN now estimates that Colombia has seen a 36% year-over-year rise in the number of people displaced by conflict in the first five months of 2024. Writing for Insight Crime, Sergio Saffon and Sara Garcia argue that Petro’s “Total Peace” plan catalyzed insurgent groups to seek control of illicit economies, such as drug production and trafficking,  by allowing them to regroup amid the ceasefire. Colombia is currently home to the world’s second-largest concentration of organized criminal activity, which increased dramatically between 2021 and 2023.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Colombia’s coca production hit a record high in 2022, rising 24% from the prior year. Territories where FARC-EMC has a significant presence produced nearly two-thirds of this crop, including in the provinces near the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan borders. In Putumayo province, coca production rose by 77% during this time, while the trafficking and processing of the crop in neighboring Ecuador has helped drive that country into chaos.

Notable FARC-EMC attacks in June 2024, including an attack on the vice president’s family. Image Source

Coca cultivation has risen significantly since 2020 and continues to trend upward. Image Source

The geographical spread of armed groups (FARC-EMC is in yellow) and major coca cultivation regions. Image Source

Hezbollah and FARC

Hezbollah has long been present in Latin America, where it remains heavily involved in criminal operations - something we explored in this June 7 article. In Colombia, Hezbollah has established a substantial foothold in the country by infiltrating Lebanese and Arab Shia communities in the Caribbean port city of Barranquilla– a key smuggling hub in the country. Colombian and US authorities have uncovered numerous Hezbollah operatives there, such as Ayman Joumaa, a Lebanese-Colombian man and suspected Hezbollah operative believed to be at the center of a multi-million dollar global money laundering ring until 2011 when the US government charged him. Last year, US authorities sanctioned three suspected Hezbollah operatives in Colombia, one of whom ran a charcoal export business as a front for drug exports. In Lebanon, the business remitted 80% of its cash flow to Hezbollah. Hezbollah also likely plays an important part in facilitating FARC’s ongoing expansion.

Hezbollah collaborates with FARC as well as its rival ELN, which both maintain a substantial presence in the Colombia–Venezuela border region. Through Venezuela, which maintains close ties to Iran, Hezbollah harnesses its vast networks to traffic Colombian cocaine and other substances to the global market in conjunction with other major distributors, such as powerful cartels operating out of Mexico.

Hezbollah’s vast global network of infiltrated Lebanese and Shia communities plays a vital role in FARC’s powerful and growing global drug trade. Hezbollah excels at money laundering because it can covertly move cash between various banks via its international front businesses and organizations. Moreover, Hezbollah has established new routes and means of transportation to move cocaine through Africa to Europe, Asia, and Australia. In this way, FARC and other illicit groups in the region rely on Hezbollah for both distribution and money laundering services. Money laundering has allowed FARC to expand its legitimate asset holdings greatly, which The Economist estimated to be over $11 billion in 2016.

Hezbollah also provides FARC with weapons. In 2014, US authorities charged Jamal Yousef in relation to an arms deal he allegedly orchestrated in Honduras. Yousef, a known Hezbollah operative, had agreed to supply FARC with military-grade weapons in exchange for hundreds of kilos of cocaine. That same year, authorities in Prague arrested Ali Fayad, a suspected top Hezbollah operative and arms trafficker, for his alleged role in the planned exchange of Ukrainian weapons for cocaine supplied by FARC. In 2020, US authorities charged Abdel El Zabayar – a former member of the Venezuelan National Assembly and close ally of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro – with trafficking weapons from the Middle East to FARC in conjunction with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Conclusion

FARC-EMC’s ongoing expansion in Colombia has global implications, especially as the group’s rising coca production stands to benefit Hezbollah amid rising tension in the Middle East. Colombia’s moves against FARC coincide with Argentina’s recently hardened stance against Hezbollah. Recently, Argentina blamed Hezbollah and Iran for 1992 and 1994 attacks in the country and sparked a row with neighboring Bolivia and Chile over claims that Hezbollah combat forces operate in those countries. Although these two factors are not likely directly related, they could signal a broader regional push against Hezbollah and its Latin American operations. If this is indeed the case, US law enforcement agencies that have long sought to implicate and eliminate regional Hezbollah operatives could find more willing partners moving forward. This trend could also further isolate Venezuela, whose close ties to Iran and Hezbollah at the official level could prove an even greater liability amid souring regional sentiments toward the Lebanese terror group.