Afghanistan: Major Potholes along China’s Belt and Road

Beijing's growing westward focus is forcing it to confront an increasingly unstable Afghanistan

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi greeted by his Afghan Taliban counterpart in Kabul in March, 2022. Source

On March 18, China’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Zhao Xing, met with Acting Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Mawlavi Abdul Kabir in Kabul to discuss increased cooperation between the two countries “in all fields.” Just days prior, Beijing called for unfreezing Afghan funds at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council. Zhao, who took up his ambassadorial post last September, is the first ambassador appointed to Kabul by any country since the Taliban takeover in 2021. 

China’s growing focus on Afghanistan stems from economic and security interests. However, the country’s ongoing instability poses a significant threat to these interests and, with no real solution in sight, could severely hinder Beijing’s regional and geopolitical aspirations moving forward. 

A regional map showing China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region in relation to Afghanistan. Source

China’s Growing Interest in Afghanistan

Beijing’s recognition of the Taliban regime stems from its multifaced interests in Afghanistan that range from vital resources to security concerns. The two countries share a less than 100-kilometer border - a narrow strip of land called the Wakhan Corridor - that connects Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province to China’s Xinjiang province. 

Afghanistan is rich in resources and a major destination for Chinese investment, with Beijing and Kabul recently agreeing to extend China’s Belt and Road (BRI) investment into Afghanistan. Last year, several – primarily Chinese – companies signed contracts in Afghanistan related to the mining and processing gold, iron ore, lead, and zinc. Afghanistan also possesses some of the world’s largest unproven reserves of lithium – a much sought-after commodity needed to produce lithium-ion batteries. China is the largest manufacturer of lithium batteries and represents some 75% of global output. The Taliban Ministry of Mine and Petroleum claims that one Chinese company has already offered to invest $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves. Chinese investment is also bolstering Afghanistan’s oil and gas production, with daily crude output reaching over 1,000 cubic tonnes earlier this year. 

Afghanistan is also an essential source of water in an increasingly dry region. The Amu Darya River – the longest in Central Asia – stems from Afghanistan’s Pamir highlands. Upstream from Afghanistan, the river is a significant source of freshwater for neighboring Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which are among the world’s most water-insecure countries. The Taliban’s planned Qosh Tepa Canal will divert substantial amounts of Amu Darya waters away from these countries to be used to bolster Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Last January, China’s Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) stated its interest in investing in water storage dams and hydroelectric projects in Afghanistan, which could also threaten water access for neighboring countries. Given Beijing’s ongoing investments in Pakistani Kashmir that divert water away from India, this could be another move to exert control over regional water resources.  

The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and Russia’s primary focus on Ukraine presents a major opportunity for China to further its interests in Central Asia, where it invests heavily in energy production. Chinese President Xi Jinping also announced plans for a grand regional development plan for Central Asia last May. These plans come as Beijing continues to develop its far western Xinjiang Autonomous Region – which borders several Central Asian countries, including Afghanistan – into a regional export and manufacturing hub, with the region’s foreign trade up nearly 46% to over $50 billion last year, according to official statistics. One study by the Chinese government even recommends creating a second capital in Xinjiang. However, to realize the full potential of its growing influence in Central Asia, Beijing must confront major security challenges, particularly those stemming from Afghanistan. 

Although China constructed the first road connecting it to Afghanistan via the Wakhan Corridor, no official border crossing has been established there. Moreover, China’s construction of multiple military installations on the Tajikistan side of the Wakhan Corridor demonstrates its concerns over security threats in Afghanistan. This militarization of the corridor comes in response to the growing threat posed by Afghanistan’s instability under the Taliban. 

Regional railway connectivity in 2022. The details of proposed BRI/CPEC infrastructure projects in Afghanistan have not been made public. Source

Afghanistan’s instability and its threat to Chinese interests

The ongoing instability of Afghanistan under Taliban rule creates space for groups with long-standing anti-China sentiments to flourish. These groups pose a severe threat to Beijing’s regional interests. 

The significant resurgence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) activity is the most important of these threats. Based in Afghanistan, the ISKP poses a broad regional threat, carrying out major attacks in Iran and Pakistan with stated ambitions to attack other countries, including China. The ISKP frequently criticizes China for its treatment of Xinjiang’s Muslim Uyghur population as well as its efforts to gain control over regional resources, stepping up its China-focused propaganda campaign over the past year. In Afghanistan, the ISKP attacked a Kabul hotel in December 2022, seriously injuring Chinese nationals. The ISKP later claimed it chose the hotel due to its popularity among Chinese businessmen. Last January, an ISKP suicide bomber unsuccessfully targeted a Chinese delegation in Kabul. 

Rising Baloch nationalism in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan also threatens Chinese interests. Baloch insurgents repeatedly attack Chinese investments in Pakistan related to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a large portion of which runs through Pakistani Balochistan. These groups also regularly target Chinese nationals working elsewhere in Pakistan. CPEC is an important means for China to access key energy markets and trade routes on the Indian Ocean while bypassing the Straits of Malacca; China also plans to connect CPEC to its BRI investments in Afghanistan. By regularly seeking refuge across Afghanistan’s porous border, Baloch insurgents continue to use Afghanistan’s ongoing instability to their advantage and the detriment of Beijing’s interests. Moreover, these groups could similarly threaten Chinese investments in Afghanistan moving forward. 

Afghanistan is also a haven for ethnic Uyghur groups that threaten China’s interests, such as the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), which first arrived in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Taliban authorities forcibly relocated TIP fighters away from the Chinese border following their takeover in 2021 in an apparent attempt to assuage Beijing; however, the group continues to operate in Afghanistan. 

ISKP propaganda from a December 2022 hotel attack in Kabul that targeted Chinese nationals. The perpetrators are pictured in the backdrop. Source

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s ongoing instability and the presence of violent groups there threaten China’s vast regional interests. Moreover, the Taliban’s warming relationship with Beijing may threaten its legitimacy moving forward, especially if it comes to relying on China – a country routinely reputed for its persecution of Muslims – for security. Heavily isolated, the Taliban regime remains ill-equipped to deal with the myriad of threats and challenges it faces in Afghanistan, making it a highly unreliable partner for Beijing or anyone else. In this way, as Central Asia becomes an increasingly important hub for energy and supply chains across Asia and Europe, an unstable Afghanistan threatens China’s growing regional interests.